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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze methodological and philosophical implications of al-
gorithmic aspects of unconventional computation. At first, we describe how the 
classical algorithmic universe developed and analyze why it became closed in 
the conventional approach to computation. Then we explain how new models 
of algorithms turned the classical closed algorithmic universe into the open 
world of algorithmic constellations, allowing higher flexibility and expressive 
power, supporting constructivism and creativity in mathematical modeling. As 
Gödel’s undecidability theorems demonstrate, the closed algorithmic universe 
restricts essential forms of mathematical cognition. In contrast, the open algo-
rithmic universe, and even more the open world of algorithmic constellations, 
remove such restrictions and enable new, richer understanding of computation. 
Keywords: Unconventional algorithms, unconventional computing, algorith-
mic constellations, Computing beyond Turing machine model. 
Introduction 
Te development of various systems is characterized by a tension be-
tween forces of conservation (tradition) and change (innovation). Tradi-
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tion sustains system and its parts, while innovation moves it forward ad-
vancing some segments and weakening the others. Efficient functioning 
of a system depends on the equilibrium between tradition and innova-
tion. When there is no equilibrium, system declines; too much tradition 
brings stagnation and often collapse under the pressure of inner or/and 
outer forces, while too much innovation leads to instability and frequent-
ly in rupture. 
The same is true of the development of different areas and aspects of 
social systems, such as science and technology. In this article we are in-
terested in computation, which has become increasingly important for 
society as the basic aspect of information technology. Tradition in com-
putation is represented by conventional computation and classical algo-
rithms, while unconventional computation stands for the far-reaching in-
novation. 
It is possible to distinguish three areas in which computation can be 
unconventional: 
1. Novel hardware (e.g. quantum systems) provides material realiza-
tion for unconventional computation. 
2. Novel algorithms (e.g. super-recursive algorithms) provide opera-
tional realization for unconventional computation.  
3. Novel organization (e.g. evolutionary computation or self-
optimizing computation) provides structural realization for unconven-
tional computation. 
Here we focus on algorithmic aspects of unconventional computation 
and analyze methodological and philosophical problems related to it, 
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making a distinction between three classes of algorithms: recursive, 
subrecursive, and super-recursive algorithms. 
Each type of recursive algorithms form a class in which it is possible 
to compute exactly the same functions that are computable by Turing 
machines. Examples of recursive algorithms are partial recursive func-
tions, RAM, von Neumann automata, Kolmogorov algorithms, and 
Minsky machines.  
Each type of subrecursive algorithms forms a class that has less com-
putational power than the class of all Turing machines. Examples of 
subrecursive algorithms are finite automata, primitive recursive func-
tions and recursive functions.  
Each type of super-recursive algorithms forms a class that has more 
computational power than the class of all Turing machines. Examples of 
super-recursive algorithms are inductive and limit Turing machines, lim-
it partial recursive functions and limit recursive functions.  
The main problem is that conventional types and models of algorithms 
make the algorithmic universe, i.e., the world of all existing and possible 
algorithms, closed because there is a rigid boundary in this universe 
formed by recursive algorithms, such as Turing machines, and described 
by the Church-Turing Thesis. This closed system has been overtly dom-
inated by discouraging incompleteness results, such as Gödel incom-
pleteness theorems. 
Contrary to this, super-recursive algorithms controlling and directing 
unconventional computations break this boundary leading to an open al-
gorithmic multiverse – world of unrestricted creativity. 
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The paper is organized as follows. First, we summarize how the closed 
algorithmic universe was created and what are advantages and disad-
vantages of living inside such a closed universe. Next, we describe the 
breakthrough brought about by the creation of super-recursive algo-
rithms. In Section 4, we analyze super-recursive algorithms as cognitive 
tools. The main effect is the immense growth of cognitive possibilities 
and computational power that enables corresponding growth of informa-
tion processing devices. 
The Closed Universe of Turing Machines and other Recursive  
Algorithms 
Historically, after having an extensive experience of problem solving, 
mathematicians understood that problem solutions were based on vari-
ous algorithms. Construction algorithms and deduction algorithms have 
been the main tools of mathematical research. When they repeatedly en-
countered problems they were not able to solve, mathematicians, and es-
pecially experts in mathematical logic, came to the conclusion that it was 
necessary to develop a rigorous mathematical concept of algorithm and 
to prove that some problems are indeed unsolvable. Consequently, a di-
versity of exact mathematical models of algorithm as a general concept 
was proposed. The first models were λ-calculus developed by Church in 
1931 – 1933, general recursive functions introduced by Gödel in 1934, 
ordinary Turing machines constructed by Turing in 1936 and in a less 
explicit form by Post in 1936, and partial recursive functions built by 
Kleene in 1936. Creating λ-calculus, Church was developing a logical 
theory of functions and suggested a formalization of the notion of com-
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putability by means of λ-definability. In 1936, Kleene demonstrated that 
λ-definability is computationally equivalent to general recursive func-
tions. In 1937, Turing showed that λ-definability is computationally 
equivalent to Turing machines. Church was so impressed by these re-
sults that he suggested what was later called the Church-Turing thesis. 
Turing formulated a similar conjecture in the Ph.D. thesis that he wrote 
under Church's supervision. 
 It is interesting to know that the theory of Frege [1] actually contains 
λ-calculus. So, there were chances to develop a theory of algorithms and 
computability in the 19th century. However, at that time, the mathemati-
cal community did not feel a need of such a theory and probably, would 
not accept it if somebody created it. 
 The Church-Turing thesis explicitly mark out a rigid boundary for the 
algorithmic universe, making this universe closed by Turing machines. 
Any algorithm from this universe was inside that boundary. 
After the first breakthrough, other mathematical models of algorithms 
were suggested. They include a variety of Turing machines: multihead, 
multitape Turing machines, Turing machines with n-dimensional tapes, 
nondeterministic, probabilistic, alternating and reflexive Turing ma-
chines, Turing machines with oracles, Las Vegas Turing machines, etc.; 
neural networks of various types – fixed-weights, unsupervised, super-
vised, feedforward, and recurrent neural networks; von Neumann au-
tomata and general cellular automata; Kolmogorov algorithms finite au-
tomata of different forms – automata without memory, autonomous 
automata, automata without output or accepting automata, determinis-
tic, nondeterministic, probabilistic automata, etc.; Minsky machines; 
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Storage Modification Machines or simply, Shönhage machines; Random 
Access Machines (RAM) and their modifications - Random Access Ma-
chines with the Stored Program (RASP), Parallel Random Access Ma-
chines (PRAM); Petri nets of various types – ordinary and ordinary with 
restrictions, regular, free, colored, and self-modifying Petri nets, etc.; 
vector machines; array machines; multidimensional structured model of 
computation and computing systems; systolic arrays; hardware modifi-
cation machines; Post productions; normal Markov algorithms; formal 
grammars of many forms – regular, context-free, context-sensitive, 
phrase-structure, etc.; and so on. As a result, the theory of algorithms, 
automata and computation has become one of the foundations of com-
puter science. 
In spite of all differences between and diversity of algorithms, there is 
a unity in the system of algorithms. While new models of algorithm ap-
peared, it was proved that no one of them could compute more functions 
than the simplest Turing machine with a one-dimensional tape. All this 
give more and more evidence to validity of the Church-Turing Thesis. 
Even more, all attempts to find mathematical models of algorithms 
that were stronger than Turing machines were fruitless. Equivalence 
with Turing machines has been proved for many models of algorithms. 
That is why the majority of mathematicians and computer scientists have 
believed that the Church-Turing Thesis was true. Many logicians assume 
that the Thesis is an axiom that does not need any proof. Few believe 
that it is possible to prove this Thesis utilizing some evident axioms. 
More accurate researchers consider this conjecture as a law of the theory 
of algorithms, which is similar to the laws of nature that might be sup-
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ported by more and more evidence or refuted by a counter-example but 
cannot be proved.  
Besides, the Church-Turing Thesis is extensively utilized in the theory 
of algorithms, as well as in the methodological context of computer sci-
ence. It has become almost an axiom. Some researchers even consider 
this Thesis as a unique absolute law of computer science. 
Thus, we can see that the initial aim of mathematicians was to build a 
closed algorithmic universe, in which a universal model of algorithm 
provided a firm foundation and as it was found later, a rigid boundary 
for this universe supposed to contain all of mathematics.  
It is possible to see the following advantages and disadvantages of the 
closed algorithmic universe. 
Advantages: 
1. Turing machines and partial recursive functions are feasible math-
ematical models. 
2. These and other recursive models of algorithms provide an efficient 
possibility to apply mathematical techniques. 
3. The closed algorithmic universe allowed mathematicians to build 
beautiful theories of Turing machines, partial recursive functions and 
some other recursive and subrecursive algorithms. 
4. The closed algorithmic universe provides sufficiently exact bounda-
ries for knowing what is possible to achieve with algorithms and what is 
impossible. 
5. The closed algorithmic universe provides a common formal lan-
guage for researchers. 
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6. For computer science and its applications, the closed algorithmic 
universe provides a diversity of mathematical models with the same 
computing power. 
Disadvantages: 
1. The main disadvantage of this universe is that its main principle - 
the Church-Turing Thesis - is not true. 
2. The closed algorithmic universe restricts applications and in par-
ticular, mathematical models of cognition. 
3. The closed algorithmic universe does not correctly reflect the exist-
ing computing practice. 
The Open World of Super-Recursive Algorithms and Algorithmic 
Constellations 
Contrary to the general opinion, some researchers expressed their con-
cern for the Church-Turing Thesis. As Nelson writes [2], "Although 
Church-Turing Thesis has been central to the theory of effective decida-
bility for fifty years, the question of its epistemological status is still an 
open one.” There were also researchers who directly suggested argu-
ments against validity of the Church-Turing Thesis. For instance, Kal-
mar [3] raised intuitionistic objections, while Lucas and Benacerraf dis-
cussed objections to mechanism based on theorems of Gödel that 
indirectly threaten the Church-Turing Thesis. In 1972, Gödel’s observa-
tion entitled “A philosophical error in Turing’s work” was published 
where he declared that: "Turing in his 1937, p. 250 (1965, p. 136), gives 
an argument which is supposed to show that mental procedures cannot 
go beyond mechanical procedures. However, this argument is inconclu-
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sive. What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its use, 
is not static, but constantly developing, i.e., that we understand abstract 
terms more and more precisely as we go on using them, and that more 
and more abstract terms enter the sphere of our understanding. There 
may exist systematic methods of actualizing this development, which 
could form part of the procedure. Therefore, although at each stage the 
number and precision of the abstract terms at our disposal may be finite, 
both (and, therefore, also Turing’s number of distinguishable states of 
mind) may converge toward infinity in the course of the application of 
the procedure.” [4] 
Thus, pointing that Turing disregarded completely the fact that mind, 
in its use, is not static, but constantly developing, Gödel predicted neces-
sity for super-recursive algorithms that realize inductive and topological 
computations [5]. Recently, Sloman [6] explained why recursive models 
of algorithms, such as Turing machines, are irrelevant for artificial intel-
ligence. 
Even if we abandon theoretical considerations and ask the practical 
question whether recursive algorithms provide an adequate model of 
modern computers, we will find that people do not see correctly how 
computers are functioning. An analysis demonstrates that while recur-
sive algorithms gave a correct theoretical representation for computers at 
the beginning of the “computer era”, super-recursive algorithms are 
more adequate for modern computers. Indeed, at the beginning, when 
computers appeared and were utilized for some time, it was necessary to 
print out data produced by computer to get a result. After printing, the 
computer stopped functioning or began to solve another problem. Now 
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people are working with displays and computers produce their results 
mostly on the screen of a monitor. These results on the screen exist there 
only if the computer functions. If this computer halts, then the result on 
its screen disappears. This is opposite to the basic condition on ordinary 
(recursive) algorithms that implies halting for giving a result. 
Such big networks as Internet give another important example of a sit-
uation in which conventional algorithms are not adequate. Algorithms 
embodied in a multiplicity of different programs organize network func-
tions. It is generally assumed that any computer program is a conven-
tional, that is, recursive algorithm. However, a recursive algorithm has to 
stop to give a result, but if a network shuts down, then something is 
wrong and it gives no results. Consequently, recursive algorithms turn 
out to be too weak for the network representation, modeling and study. 
Even more, no computer works without an operating system. Any op-
erating system is a program and any computer program is an algorithm 
according to the general understanding. While a recursive algorithm has 
to halt to give a result, we cannot say that a result of functioning of oper-
ating system is obtained when computer stops functioning. To the con-
trary, when the operating system does not work, it does not give an ex-
pected result. 
Looking at the history of unconventional computations and super-
recursive algorithms we see that Turing was the first who went beyond 
the “Turing” computation that is bounded by the Church-Turing Thesis. 
In his 1938 doctoral dissertation, Turing introduced the concept of a Tu-
ring machine with an oracle. This, work was subsequently published in 
1939. Another approach that went beyond the Turing-Church Thesis was 
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developed by Shannon [7], who introduced the differential analyzer, a 
device that was able to perform continuous operations with real numbers 
such as operation of differentiation. However, mathematical community 
did not accept operations with real numbers as tractable because irra-
tional numbers do not have finite numerical representations.  
In 1957, Grzegorczyk introduced a number of equivalent definitions of 
computable real functions. Three of Grzegorczyk’s constructions have 
been extended and elaborated independently to super-recursive method-
ologies: the domain approach [8,9], type 2 theory of effectivity or type 2 
recursion theory [10,11], and the polynomial approximation approach 
[12]. In 1963, Scarpellini introduced the class M1 of functions that are 
built with the help of five operations. The first three are elementary: sub-
stitutions, sums and products of functions. The two remaining operations 
are performed with real numbers: integration over finite intervals and 
taking solutions of Fredholm integral equations of the second kind.  
Yet another type of super-recursive algorithms was introduced in 1965 
by Gold and Putnam, who brought in concepts of limiting recursive 
function and limiting partial recursive function. In 1967, Gold produced 
a new version of limiting recursion, also called inductive inference, and 
applied it to problems of learning. Now inductive inference is a fruitful 
direction in machine learning and artificial intelligence.  
One more direction in the theory of super-recursive algorithms 
emerged in 1967 when Zadeh introduced fuzzy algorithms. It is interest-
ing that limiting recursive function and limiting partial recursive func-
tion were not considered as valid models of algorithms even by their au-
thors. A proof that fuzzy algorithms are more powerful than Turing 
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machines was obtained much later (Wiedermann, 2004). Thus, in spite 
of the existence of super-recursive algorithms, researchers continued to 
believe in the Church-Turing Thesis as an absolute law of computer sci-
ence. 
After the first types of super-recursive models had been studied, a lot 
of other super-recursive algorithmic models have been created: inductive 
Turing machines, limit Turing machines, infinite time Turing machines, 
general Turing machines, accelerating Turing machines, type 2 Turing 
machines, mathematical machines, δ-Q-machines,  general dynamical 
systems, hybrid systems, finite dimensional machines over real numbers, 
R-recursive functions and so on. 
To organize the diverse variety of algorithmic models, we introduce 
the concept of an algorithmic constellation. Namely, an algorithmic con-
stellation is a system of algorithmic models that have the same type. 
Some algorithmic constellations are disjoint, while other algorithmic 
constellations intersect. There are algorithmic constellations that are 
parts of other algorithmic constellations. 
Below some of algorithmic constellations are described. 
The sequential algorithmic constellation consists of models of sequen-
tial algorithms. This constellation includes such models as deterministic 
finite automata, deterministic pushdown automata with one stack, evolu-
tionary finite automata, Turing machines with one head and one tape, 
Post productions, partial recursive functions, normal Markov algorithms, 
formal grammars, inductive Turing machines with one head and one 
tape, limit Turing machines with one head and one tape, reflexive Turing 
machines with one head and one tape, infinite time Turing machines, 
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general Turing machines with one head and one tape, evolutionary Tu-
ring machines with one head and one tape, accelerating Turing machines 
with one head and one tape, type 2 Turing machines with one head and 
one tape, Turing machines with oracles.   
The concurrent algorithmic constellation consists of models of con-
current algorithms. This constellation includes such models as Petri nets, 
artificial neural networks, nondeterministic Turing machines, probabilis-
tic Turing machines, alternating Turing machines, Communicating Se-
quential Processes (CSP) of Hoare, Actor model, Calculus of Communi-
cating Systems (CCS) of Milner, Kahn process networks, dataflow 
process networks, discrete event simulators, View-Centric Reasoning 
(VCR) model of Smith, event-signal-process (ESP) model of Lee and 
Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, extended view-centric reasoning (EVCR) 
model of Burgin and Smith, labeled transition systems, Algebra of 
Communicating Processes (ACP) of Bergstra and Klop, event-action-
process (EAP) model of Burgin and Smith, synchronization trees, and 
grid automata. 
The parallel algorithmic constellation consists of models of parallel 
algorithms and is a part of the concurrent algorithmic constellation. This 
constellation includes such models as pushdown automata with several 
stacks, Turing machines with several heads and one or several tapes, 
Parallel Random Access Machines, Kolmogorov algorithms, formal 
grammars with prohibition, inductive Turing machines with several 
heads and one or several tapes, limit Turing machines with several heads 
and one or several tapes, reflexive Turing machines with several heads 
and one or several tapes, general Turing machines with several heads 
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and one or several tapes, accelerating Turing machines with several 
heads and one or several tapes, type 2 Turing machines with several 
heads and one or several tapes.   
The discrete algorithmic constellation consists of models of algo-
rithms that work with discrete data, such as words of formal language. 
This constellation includes such models as finite automata, Turing ma-
chines, partial recursive functions, formal grammars, inductive Turing 
machines and Turing machines with oracles.   
The topological algorithmic constellation consists of models of algo-
rithms that work with data that belong to a topological space, such as re-
al numbers. This constellation includes such models as the differential 
analyzer of Shannon, limit Turing machines, finite dimensional and gen-
eral machines of Blum, Shub, and Smale, fixed point models, topologi-
cal algorithms, neural networks with real number parameters.   
Although several models of super-recursive algorithms already existed 
in 1980s, the first publication where it was explicitly stated and proved 
that there are algorithms more powerful than Turing machines was [13]. 
In this work, among others, relations between Gödel’s incompleteness 
results and super-recursive algorithms were discussed. 
Super-recursive algorithms have different computing and accepting 
power. The closest to conventional algorithms are inductive Turing ma-
chines of the first order because they work with constructive objects, all 
steps of their computation are the same as the steps of conventional Tu-
ring machines and the result is obtained in a finite time. In spite of these 
similarities, inductive Turing machines of the first order can compute 
much more than conventional Turing machines [14, 5].  
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Inductive Turing machines of the first order form only the lowest level 
of super-recursive algorithms. There are infinitely more levels and as a 
result, the algorithmic universe grows into the algorithmic multiverse 
becoming open and amenable. Taking into consideration algorithmic 
schemas, which go beyond super-recursive algorithms, we come to an 
open world of information processing, which includes the algorithmic 
multiverse with its algorithmic constellations. Openness of this world 
has many implications for human cognition in general and mathematical 
cognition in particular. For instance, it is possible to demonstrate that not 
only computers but also the brain can work not only in the recursive 
mode but also in the inductive mode, which is essentially more powerful 
and efficient. Some of the examples are considered in the next section.  
Absolute Prohibition in The Closed Universe  
and Infinite Opportunities in The Open World 
To provide sound and secure foundations for mathematics, David Hilbert 
proposed an ambitious and wide-ranging program in the philosophy and 
foundations of mathematics. His approach formulated in 1921 stipulated 
two stages. At first, it was necessary to formalize classical mathematics 
as an axiomatic system. Then, using only restricted, "finitary" means, it 
was necessary to give proofs of the consistency of this axiomatic system. 
Achieving a definite progress in this direction, Hilbert became very 
optimistic. As a response to the Latin dictum: "Ignoramus et 
ignorabimus" or "We do not know, we cannot know", in his speech in 
Königsberg in 1930, he made a famous statement: 
Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden wissen.  
(We must know. We will know.) 
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Next year the Gödel undecidability theorems were published [15]. 
They undermined Hilbert’s statement and his whole program. Indeed, 
the first Gödel undecidability theorem states that it is impossible to vali-
date truth for all true statements about objects in an axiomatic theory that 
includes formal arithmetic. This is a consequence of the fact that it is 
impossible to build all sets from the arithmetical hierarchy by Turing 
machines. In such a way, the closed Algorithmic Universe imposed re-
striction on the mathematical exploration. Indeed, rigorous mathematical 
proofs are done in formal mathematical systems. As it is demonstrated 
(cf., for example, [16]), such systems are equivalent to Turing machines 
as they are built by means of Post productions. Thus, as Turing machines 
can model proofs in formal systems, it is possible to assume that proofs 
are performed by Turing machines.  
The second Gödel undecidability theorem states that for an effectively 
generated consistent axiomatic theory T that includes formal arithmetic 
and has means for formal deduction, it is impossible to prove consisten-
cy of T using these means. 
From the very beginning, Gödel undecidability theorems have been 
comprehended as absolute restrictions for scientific cognition. That is 
why Gödel undecidability theorems were so discouraging that many 
mathematicians consciously or unconsciously disregarded them. For in-
stance, the influential group of mostly French mathematicians who wrote 
under the name Bourbaki completely ignored results of Gödel [17].  
However, later researchers came to the conclusion that these theorems 
have such drastic implications only for formalized cognition based on 
rigorous mathematical tools. For instance, in the 1964 postscript, Gödel 
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wrote that undecidability theorems “do not establish any bounds for the 
powers of human reason, but rather for the potentialities of pure formal-
ism in mathematics.”   
Discovery of super-recursive algorithms and acquisition of the 
knowledge of their abilities drastically changed understanding of the 
Gödel’s results. Being a consequence of the closed nature of the closed 
algorithmic universe, these undecidability results lose their fatality in the 
open algorithmic universe. They become relativistic being dependent on 
the tools used for cognition. For instance, the first undecidability theo-
rem is equivalent to the statement that it is impossible to compute by Tu-
ring machines or other recursive algorithms all levels of the Arithmetical 
Hierarchy [18]. However, as it is demonstrated in [19], there is a hierar-
chy of inductive Turing machines so that all levels of the Arithmetical 
Hierarchy are computable and even decidable by these inductive Turing 
machines. Complete proofs of these results were published only in 2003 
due to the active opposition of the proponents of the Church-Turing 
Thesis [14]. In spite of the fast development of computer technology and 
computer science, the research community in these areas is rather con-
servative although more and more researchers understand that the 
Church-Turing Thesis is not correct. 
The possibility to use inductive proofs makes the Gödel’s results rela-
tive to the means used for proving mathematical statements because de-
cidability of the Arithmetical Hierarchy implies decidability of the for-
mal arithmetic. For instance, the first Gödel undecidability theorem is 
true when recursive algorithms are used for proofs but it becomes false 
when inductive algorithms, such as inductive Turing machines, are uti-
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lized. History of mathematics also gives supportive evidence for this 
conclusion. For instance, in 1936 by Gentzen, who in contrast to the se-
cond Gödel undecidability theorem, proved consistency of the formal 
arithmetic using ordinal induction. 
The hierarchy of inductive Turing machines also explains why the 
brain of people is more powerful than Turing machines, supporting the 
conjecture of Roger Penrose [20]. Besides, this hierarchy allows re-
searchers to eliminate restrictions of recursive models of algorithms in 
artificial intelligence described by Sloman [6].  
It is important to remark that limit Turing machines and other topolog-
ical algorithms [21] open even broader perspectives for information pro-
cessing technology and artificial intelligence than inductive Turing ma-
chines. 
The Open World of Knowledge and The Internet 
The open world, or more exactly, the open world of knowledge, is an 
important concept for the knowledge society and its knowledge econo-
my. According to Rossini [12], it emerges from a world of pre-Internet 
political systems, but it has come to encompass an entire worldview 
based on the transformative potential of open, shared, and connected 
technological systems. The idea of an open world synthesizes much of 
the social and political discourse around modern education and scientific 
endeavor and is at the core of the Open Access (OA) and Open Educa-
tional Resources (OER) movements. While the term open society comes 
from international relations, where it was developed to describe the tran-
sition from political oppression into a more democratic society, it is now 
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being appropriated into a broader concept of an open world connected 
via technology [22]. The idea of openness in access to knowledge and 
education is a reaction to the potential afforded by the global networks, 
but is inspired by the sociopolitical concept of the open society. 
Open Access (OA) is a knowledge-distribution model by which schol-
arly, peer-reviewed journal articles and other scientific publications are 
made freely available to anyone, anywhere over the Internet. It is the 
foundation for the open world of scientific knowledge, and thus, a prin-
cipal component of the open world of knowledge as a whole. In the era 
of print, open access was economically and physically impossible. In-
deed, the lack of physical access implied the lack of knowledge access - 
if one did not have physical access to a well-stocked library, knowledge 
access was impossible. The Internet has changed all of that, and OA is a 
movement that recognizes the full potential of an open world metaphor 
for the network. 
In OA, the old tradition of publishing for the sake of inquiry, 
knowledge, and peer acclaim and the new technology of the Internet 
have converged to make possible an unprecedented public good: "the 
world-wide electronic distribution of the peer-reviewed journal litera-
ture" [23]. 
The open world of knowledge is based on the Internet, while the In-
ternet is based on computations that go beyond Turing machines. One of 
the basic principles of the Internet is that it is always on, always availa-
ble. Without these features, the Internet cannot provide the necessary 
support for the open world of knowledge because ubiquitous availability 
of knowledge resources demands non-stopping work of the Internet. At 
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the same time, classical models of algorithms, such as Turing machines, 
stop after giving that result. This contradicts the main principles of the 
Internet. In contrast to classical models of computation, as it is demon-
strated in [5], if an automatic system, e.g., a computer or computer net-
work, works without halting, gives results in this mode and can simulate 
any operation of a universal Turing machine, then this automatic (com-
puter) system is more powerful than any Turing machine. This means 
that this automatic (computer) system, in particular, the Internet, per-
forms unconventional computations and is controlled by super-recursive 
algorithms. As it is explained in [5], attempts to reduce some of these 
systems, e.g., the Internet, to the recursive mode, which allows modeling 
by Turing machines, make these systems irrelevant. 
Conclusions 
This paper shows how the universe (the world) of algorithms became 
open with the discovery of super-recursive algorithms, providing more 
powerful tools for computational cognition and artificial intelligence.  
Here we considered only some of the consequences of the open world 
environment of unconventional algorithms and algorithmic constella-
tions for mathematical (computation-theoretical) cognition. It would be 
interesting to study other consequences of current break through into an 
open world of unconventional algorithms and computation.  
It is known that not all quantum mechanical events are Turing-
computable. So, it would be interesting to find a class of super-recursive 
algorithms that compute all such events or to prove that such a class 
does not exist. 
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It might be methodologically and philosophically interesting to con-
template relations between the Open World of Algorithmic Constella-
tions and the Open Science in the sense of Nielsen [24]. For instance, 
one of the pivotal features of the Open Science is accessibility of re-
search results on the Internet. At the same time, as it is demonstrated in 
[5], the Internet and other big networks of computers are always working 
in the inductive mode or some other super-recursive mode. Moreover, 
actual accessibility depends on such modes of functioning. 
One more interesting problem is to explore relations between the Open 
World of Algorithmic Constellations with the theoretical framework of 
Info-computationalism, a synthesis of Pancomputationalism (Naturalist 
Computationalism) with Informational Structural Realism – the model of 
a universe as a network of computational processes on informational 
structures. Info-computationalism connects algorithms with interactive 
computing in natural (physical) systems [25,26][28]. Connecting new 
unconventional models of super-recursive algorithms and Algorithmic 
Constellations with unconventional computations performed by natural 
systems opens new possibilities for the development of innovative mod-
els of physical computation with “Trans-Turing” algorithms and “Non-
Von” computing architectures. [27]. 
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